CHANGE IN CUSTODY TERRY BANKERT LAWYER 810-235-1970

DID YOU KNOW.

MCL 722.27(1)(c) provides that in a custody dispute, a trial court, for the best interests of the child at the center of the dispute, may “modify or amend its previous judgments or orders for proper cause shown or because of change of circumstances.” 

[Principle source e-journal #71713, Unpublished 11/14/19.No.349021. ]

But the court is not permitted to “modify or amend its previous judgments or orders or issue a new order so as to change the established custodial environment of a child unless there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child.” MCL 722.27(1)(c).

“These initial steps to changing custody— finding a change of circumstance or proper cause and not changing an established custodial environment without clear and convincing evidence—are intended to erect a barrier against removal of a child from an established custodial environment and to minimize unwarranted and disruptive changes of custody orders.” Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 509; 675 NW2d 847 (2003) (quotation marks omitted). 

The first step in the analysis is to determine whether the moving party has established proper cause or a change of circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 508-509.

In McRoberts v Ferguson, 322 Mich App 125, 131-132; 910 NW2d 721 (2017), this Court explained: Proper cause means one or more appropriate grounds that have or could have a significant effect on the child’s life to the extent that a reevaluation of the child’s custodial situation should be undertaken. 

In order to establish a change of circumstances, a movant must prove that, since the entry of the last custody order, the conditions surrounding custody of the child, which have or could have a significant effect on the child’s well-being, have materially changed.

To constitute a change of circumstances under MCL 722.27(1)(c), the evidence must demonstrate something more than the normal life changes (both good and bad) that occur during the life of a child, and there must be at least some evidence that the material changes have had or will almost certainly have an effect on the child. [Citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted.] 

With respect to the issue of “proper cause,” the criteria outlined in the statutory best

interest factors, MCL 722.23, “should be relied on by a trial court in deciding if a particular fact raised by a party is a ‘proper’ or ‘appropriate’ ground to revisit custody orders.” Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 512. 

In regard to “change of circumstances,” the relevance of facts presented should also “be[] gauged by the statutory best interest factors.” Id. at 514. “Although the threshold consideration of whether there was proper cause or a change of circumstances might be fact-intensive, the court need not necessarily conduct an evidentiary hearing on the topic.” Corporan, 282 Mich App at 605. 

In Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 512, this Court, addressing the threshold issue, observed: Obviously, trial courts must make this factual determination case by case. Although these decisions will be based on the facts particular to each case, we do not suggest that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve this initial question. 

Often times, the facts alleged to constitute proper cause or a change of circumstances will be undisputed, or the court can accept as true the facts allegedly comprising proper cause or a change of circumstances, and then decide if they are legally sufficient to satisfy the standard.

 MCR 3.210(C)(8) provides: In deciding whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary with regard to a postjudgment motion to change custody, the court must determine, by requiring an offer of proof or otherwise, whether there are contested factual issues that must be resolved in order for the court to make an informed decision on the motion.

 It is clear to us, and was effectively accepted by the trial court, that if the allegations set forth in plaintiff’s motion to modify custody are true, they would easily establish a change of circumstances and proper cause for purposes of revisiting the issue of custody under the statutory best-interest factors.

 But the trial court found it problematic that plaintiff had not submitted any statements, affidavits, reports, or other documentary evidence to support the allegations, let alone evidence that was current and relevant. 

The motion to modify custody was not verified, nor did plaintiff supply her own affidavit. MCR 3.210(C)(8) allowed the trial court to require “an offer of proof or otherwise” in relation to deciding whether to order an evidentiary hearing.

Under the circumstances of the case and given the remarks made by the trial court when ruling on the motion, the court’s hesitation and resistance at giving any weight to the allegations in plaintiff’s motion was plainly driven by the four CPS investigations instigated by plaintiff that resulted in determinations that allegations of abuse by defendant could not be substantiated.

The lack of substantiation, again and again, could reasonably call into question plaintiff’s motives and credibility on all matters.

 The trial court appeared more than open to further considering a motion to modify custody if plaintiff would come forward with supporting documentary evidence, explaining why the court took the unusual step of denying the motion without prejudice.

 Indeed, the record and the CPS history support the trial court’s decision to deny the motion to modify custody simply on the-1970 basis that plaintiff did not provide supporting documentation on the threshold issue of change of circumstances or proper cause."

Presented here by Terry Bankert Flint Divorce Attorney 810-235-1970 FlintFamilyLaw.com

IN DIVORCE THIS ADAM LOST TO EVE, WIFE GETS MORE PROPERTY.by FLINT DIVORCE ATTORNEY TERRY BANKERT

Flint Divorce Attorney Terry Bankert ,810-235-1970 discusses several Issues: 1.Divorce;


2.The defendant-husband's claim that the property division was inequitable; Pickering v. Pickering; Reed v. Reed;

3.The factors in Sparks v. Sparks; Berger v. Berger; Thames v. Thames;

4Infidelity; Davey v. Davey;

4Dissipation of martial assets; Woodington v. Shokoohi



SOURCE:Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished 02/15/2011),

Case Name: S----- v. S-----, Livingston Circuit Court, LC No. 08-003892-DO

e-Journal Number: 48129,Judge(s): Per Curiam - Murphy, Murray, and Shapiro,

[Comments of Flint Divorce Lawyer Terry Bankert ALL CAPS or trb]



YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO APPEAL THE DECISION OF YOUR LOCAL DIVORCE COURT



A trial court’s factual findings will not be reversed unless they are found

to be clearly erroneous, meaning that, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Reed v Reed, 265 Mich App 131, 150; 693 NW2d 825 (2005).



GOOD LUCK IF YOU TRY

A trial court’s dispositional ruling should be affirmed unless this Court is left with the firm conviction that the property division was inequitable. Pickering, 268 Mich App at 7.



HIGH COURT DECISION



The Michigan Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that an unequal division of marital property is not contrary to Michigan law as long as it is based on the appropriate criteria, the trial court properly determined the situation (after a 38-year marriage) did not warrant a 50-50 property division based on the property division factors, and the trial court did not err in awarding the plaintiff-wife $150,000 in alimony in gross.

The LIVINGSTON DIVORCE trial court used its equitable powers to mold relief according to the nature of the case and did what was necessary to accord complete equity and to resolve the controversy. The MICHGIAN COURT OF APPEALS concluded that reversal was not warranted as to the division of property.

HOW DOES A COURT MAKE A PROPERTY DIVISION?

In dividing the marital property, the trial court’s opinion here addressed the property division

factors set forth in Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141, 159-160; 485 NW2d 893 (1992).

The Sparks Court stated:

We hold that the following factors are to be considered wherever they are

relevant to the circumstances of the particular case: (1) duration of the marriage,

(2) contributions of the parties to the marital estate, (3) age of the parties, (4)

health of the parties, (5) life status of the parties, (6) necessities and circumstances

of the parties, (7) earning abilities of the parties, (8) past relations and conduct of

the parties, and (9) general principles of equity. There may even be additional

factors that are relevant to a particular case. For example, the court may choose to

consider the interruption of the personal career or education of either party. The

determination of relevant factors will vary depending on the facts and

circumstances of the case. [Id. (citation omitted).]



HUSBANDS ARGUMENT-WIFE CAN WORK!

On appeal the defendant-husband argued the trial court made factual findings that were unsupported by the record - particularly that the wife might be unable to work in the future due to poor health,

HUSBAND ARGUES WIFE EQUALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR BAD INVESTMENTS

the defendant should bear the sole responsibility for bad marital investments and (indirectly) the balance on the equity line of credit,

HUSBANDS ARGUMENT- INFIDELITY NOT A BIG DEAL

and the LIVINGSTON DIVORCE trial court placed an inordinate amount of weight on his infidelity in dividing the martial assets.



…defendant complains that the trial court placed an inordinate amount of emphasis

on his affair and ordered an inequitable property distribution to punish him. A circumstance "to be considered in the determination of property division is the fault or misconduct of a party." Davey v Davey, 106 Mich App 579, 581-582; 308 NW2d 468 (1981). However, “the trial court must consider all the relevant factors and not assign disproportionate weight to any one circumstance.” Sparks, 440 Mich at 158.

HUSBAND CONTINUED AFFAIR WHILE IN COUNSELING WITH WIFE

The trial court found defendant’s affair to be significant in relationship to assessing defendant’s credibility. It is undisputed that defendant lied to plaintiff

about the existence of the affair, misled her about the termination of the affair, and participated in counseling with plaintiff while still engaging in the affair.

WIFE GETS $150,000

The court noted that the disparity in the property division was essentially created by the award to the wife of $150,000 in alimony in gross, given that the trial court otherwise evenly divided, for the most part, the marital estate.

DID YOU KNOW?

Woodington v Shokoohi, 288 Mich App 352; __ NW2d __ (2010) (when a party has dissipated marital assets absent the fault of the other spouse, the value of the dissipated assets can be included in the marital estate).



WHAT IS ALIMONY IN GROSS

If alimony, now referred to as spousal support, is either a lump sum or a definite sum to be paid in installments, it is alimony in gross, which is not truly alimony intended for a spouse’s maintenance, but rather is in the nature of a division of property. Staple v Staple, 241 Mich App 562, 580; 616 NW2d 219 (2000).

NO VALUE IN MARITAL HOME

There was no equity and was indeed negative equity in the marital home awarded to the wife, where its appraised value was surpassed by the mortgage and the balance on the home equity line of credit, which the trial court ordered the wife to pay.

ALIMONY TO PAY OFF LINE OF CREDIT

It appeared from the record that the trial court ordered the husband to pay alimony in gross so that plaintiff could use the funds to pay off the balance due on the line of credit, which nearly equaled the amount of alimony.

LIVINGSTON COUNTY DIVORCE COURT GOT IT RIGHT

On the record presented at trial, and given all of the circumstances in the case, there was no inequity in the trial court's decision. Affirmed.

DIVORCE PROPERTY DIVISION CAN BE UNEQUAL

An unequal division of marital property is not contrary to Michigan law as long as it is

based on appropriate criteria. Washington v Washington, 283 Mich App 667, 673; 770 NW2d 908 (2009). Here, the property division favored plaintiff; however, the trial court assessed the relevant factors, and the record supported such findings. Moreover, "there is no Michigan statute or caselaw that precludes outright a substantial deviation from numerical equality in a property distribution award." Id. In this case, the trial determined that the situation did not warrant a 50- 50 property division based upon the property division factors. The trial court did not err in awarding plaintiff $150,000 in alimony in gross. The trial court used its equitable powers to mold relief according to the nature of the case and it did what was necessary to accord complete equity and to conclude the controversy. Cohen v Cohen, 125 Mich App 206, 211; 335 NW2d 661 (1983).



If you have question about Divorce, custody , child support or bankruptcy call Flint Attorney Terry Bankert 1-810-235-1970

http://www.attorneybankert.com/

WHAT IS SEPARATE PROPERTY IN A DIVORCE?

DID YOU KNOW the definition of Separate Property?


DIVORCE LAW IS FILLED WITH WORD OF CLOUDY MEANING.


Words like “marital property” lack statutory definition, so  does  “separate property”. A question your  divorce attorney will have to ask is when does  a  valuable asset become  characterized as separate property, as well as the starting point when identifying property per Reeves. An easy definition is that  separate property is the  flip side to marital property, and is generally not subject to division between the parties.


Terry Ray Bankert is a Michigan Attorney specializing in Family Law, and works as a Flint Divorce Attorney, Flint Divorce lawyer, Genesee Divorce Lawyer and Genesee Divorce Attorney.(SEO) For help with your questions call 810-235-1970. Or http://www.attorneybankert.com/  . Principle Source ICLE 09/16/10



So when do we havs Satutory Authority to Invade  or take Separate Property

The two statutory exceptions are a §401 “contribution” claim, and a §23 “insufficiency” claim (MCL 552.401 and MCL 552.23).

These two statutory exceptions are set forth below.

The first exception, a §401 “contribution” claim, is:

The circuit court of this state may include in any decree of divorce or of separate maintenance entered in the circuit court appropriate provisions awarding to a party all or a portion of the property, either real or personal, owned by his or her spouse, as appears to the court to be equitable under all the circumstances of the case, if it appears from the evidence in the case that the party contributed to the acquisition, improvement, or accumulation of the property. The decree, upon becoming final, shall have the same force and effect as a quitclaim deed of the real estate, if any, or a bill of sale of the personal property, if any, given by the party’s spouse to the party.


The second exception, a §23 “insufficiency” claim, is:

Upon entry of a judgment of divorce or separate maintenance, if the estate and effects awarded to either party are insufficient for the suitable support and maintenance of either party and any children of the marriage as are committed to the care and custody of either party, the court may further award to either party the part of the real and personal estate of either party and spousal support out of the real and personal estate, to be paid to either party in gross or otherwise as the court considers just and reasonable, after considering the ability of either party to pay and the character and situation of the parties, and all the other circumstances of the case.


Reeves implicitly overruled an earlier line of cases which held that separate property was simply another factor to consider when fairly dividing the entire estate. Because of Reeves and its progeny, general principles of equity do not constitute a sufficient reason for the invasion of separate property under either statutory exception. See, for example, Schneider v Schneider, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 28, 2003 (Docket No. 245578) slip op pp 2–3.

C. Burden of Proof

There are no reported cases that expressly define which party bears the burden of proof in a separate property claim. However, it appears from the cases that the owner-spouse must prove a separate property claim in order to keep the property separate, and the nonowner-spouse must prove a statutory exception on order to justify invading the separate property.


These separate property claim frequently occurs in second marriages involves the ownership of a home by one of the spouses at the time of the marriage. In that case, establish both the fair market value of the home (and, therefore, the equity of the owner-spouse) at the time of the marriage, as well as the current fair market value of the home. All qualified real estate appraisers have access to historical records to adequately prepare an appraisal report for the value of a home even decades in the past.

Here are some examples of Separate Property

A. Premarital Property



Premarital property, that is, property a party owned before the marriage, is separate property. Reeves, Lee, and Korth v Korth, 256 Mich App 286; 662 NW2d 111 (2003).



B. Property Acquired During Cohabitation



Property acquired during cohabitation is separate property. Reeves. The footnote, which in one fell swoop created critical law in this area, is worth reproducing in these materials:



Rather than focusing on the four years the parties had been married, the court said it was equitably considering the parties to have been married for eight years. This was error. Michigan does not recognize common-law marriages. Carnes v Sheldon, 109 Mich App 204, 211, 216–217; 311 NW2d 747 (1981). Cohabitating with someone is not the same as marrying them. Further, Bone, supra, required the court to look at the period that began with the marriage. A court is not free to expand this period to include any cohabitation that may have occurred before the parties marry. Reeves at 493 n 1.[10][Emphasis supplied.]


What Reeves is to property, Korth is to spousal support. The Korth court’s rationale was stated as follows:


Although the past relations and conduct of the parties is one factor the trial court may consider in determining whether to award spousal support, Michigan has a strong public policy supporting the institution of marriage…. This policy was undermined by the trial court’s holding in the present case. The trial court was required to limit its consideration to “the length of the marriage,” not the length of the relationship, in awarding spousal support.

C.Inherited Property



Inherited property is, at least where it has been kept separate from marital property, is generally treated as separate property. Lee, Dart, and Wells v Wells, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued November 20, 2007 (Docket No. 271465) (parent’s conveyance to son of family farm deemed “pre-inheritance transfer”, thus separate asset).



D. Gifted Property



Gifted property, at least that which is intended for the donee-spouse only, has traditionally been considered separate property. Brookhouse v Brookhouse, 286 Mich 151; 281 NW2d 573 (1938); Hackert v Hackert, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued May 5, 1995 (Docket No. 153308) (jewelry and part of a doll collection given to W by H during the course of the marriage were items of personal use or adornment, and therefore separate property of the recipient spouse); and Francis v Francis, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued June 13, 1995 (Docket No. 150780) (H’s gift to W of a diamond engagement ring was W’s separate property). But, see Hance v Hance, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued August 21, 1998 (Docket No. 200684) (interspousal gifts of jewelry deemed marital property).



E. Damages for Pain and Suffering



Pain and suffering awards in the context of personal injury cases are separate property (as opposed to economic losses covering the time of the marriage). Bywater v Bywater, 128 Mich App 396, 398; 340 NW2d 102 (1983); Lee at 79; and Stoudemire v Stoudemire, 248 Mich App 325, 339; 639 NW2d 274 (2001). But, see Pickering v Pickering, 268 Mich App 1; 706 NW2d 835 (2005) (lawsuit proceeds deemed marital asset where both H and W were plaintiffs [H injured riding bicycle; W loss of consortium], joint check issued and deposited to joint account, and parties treated the settlement proceeds as a joint marital asset).



F. Pre/Postmarital Retirement Benefits



Although presumptively separate property, premarital pension benefits may be treated as part of the marital estate, per Booth v Booth, 194 Mich App 284, 291; 486 NW2d 116 (1992), and pension contributions made post-divorce are assets which may be considered part of the marital estate, per Boonstra v Boonstra, 209 Mich App 558, 563; 531 NW2d 777 (1995).



A thorny question arises when a portion of a defined contribution plan, such as a 401k, was accrued prior to the marriage, but investments in the plan continued during the marriage. It is easy to identify the account balance at the time of marriage and return that to the contributing spouse as his/her separate property upon divorce. But does that, without more, shortchange the contributing spouse by denying him/her the benefit of earnings during the marriage on those premarital contributions? With sufficient economic data or testimony, it should be possible to segregate earnings on premarital contributions (which in theory are separate property) from earnings of contributions made from income during the marriage (which is clearly marital property). Yet this approach was rejected recently by the Court of Appeals in the unpublished of Skinner v Skinner, Court of Appeals No. 289740, decided 5/18/10.[11]



Drafting Tip: The language used in Booth and Boonstra to describe the process of awarding a portion of separate property to the nonowner-spouse, “treated/considered”, is not technically correct. Frankly, sloppy use of language creates confusion. Purists, like James P. Ryan, Esq., of Plymouth, point out that the proper language is, instead, “invaded/divided”.



G. Why It Matters - Invasion of Separate Property



Notwithstanding a characterization of an asset as “separate”, the tenacious and creative practitioner will find case law on both sides of most of these issues. Other legal concepts like “commingling” may destroy the separate nature of an otherwise separate asset, and thereby permit the court to treat the asset as marital property.



The cases are obviously fact-intensive, and much depends on the development of the proofs. The key is to understand that a marital asset is subject to division using the equitable factors found in Sparks, while a separate asset may only be divided if either of the statutory exceptions is met.



A. Motion for Partial Summary Disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116 when dealing with separate property claims, particularly when a §23 “insufficiency” claim is not asserted. You educate the court on your claim (either that the asset is separate or marital), and a ruling either way should greatly assist in resolving the case.



Defining the marital estate is not easy. Neither is defining what “marital” and “separate” property are. Ultimately, it is a matter of advocacy, that is, persuading the fact-finder based on knowledge of the law and what makes common sense in a particular fact-pattern. The intent of these materials is to make you a better advocate




Terry Ray Bankert is a Michigan Attorney specializing in Family Law, and works as a Flint Divorce Attorney, Flint Divorce lawyer, Genesee Divorce Lawyer and Genesee Divorce Attorney.(SEO) For help with your questions call 810-235-1970. Or http://www.attorneybankert.com/ . Principle Source ICLE 09/16/10