PRE-NUPTIAL Agreement in Saginaw Divorce

SAGINAW DIVORCE PRE-NUPTUAL REVIEWED BY ATTORNEY TERRY BANKERT A DIVORCE LAWYER. For immediate help with your family law questions call 810-235-1970.

THE SAGINAW DIVORCE PRE- NUPTIAL CASE

CHERI L. WOODINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v KAMRAN SHOKOOHI, Defendant-Appellee/Cross- Appellant.
Docket No(s) 288923, Published 05/04/2010
Trial Court/lower Court Saginaw County Circuit Court.
Trial Court Judge Robert L. Kaczarek
Lower Court Docket No(s) LC No. 06-060841-DM
(This opinion has been modified for media presentation)
To see original document, http://coa.courts.mi.gov/documents/opinions/final/coa/20100504_c288923_61_288923opn.pdf



SAAD, J.
Plaintiff Cheri Woodington appeals the trial court’s judgment of divorce. She argues that the trial court made inadequate findings of fact in regard to the value of marital property, the date of valuation, and the status of certain assets as marital or separate property. She also raises issues concerning discovery, spousal support, and attorney fees. Defendant Kamran Shokoohi cross-appeals and contends that the trial court erred in failing to divide the property in accordance with the parties’ prenuptial agreement. We affirm some aspects of the trial court’s judgment; however, because the inadequacy of the trial court’s findings on several of these matters precludes meaningful appellate review, we remand for further proceedings.




VI. DEFENDANT’S CROSS-APPEAL: PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT
On cross-appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s determination that the parties did not intend for the prenuptial agreement to apply to a divorce. A trial court’s refusal to enforce a prenuptial agreement is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Rinvelt v Rinvelt, 190 Mich App 372, 382; 475 NW2d 478 (1991).
Under Michigan law, trial courts recognize prenuptial agreements governing the division of property in the event of a divorce. Reed, 265 Mich App at 141-142. A court should never disregard a valid prenuptial agreement but should instead enforce its clear and unambiguous terms as written. Id. at 144-145. See also MCL 557.28, providing that “[a] contract relating to property made between persons in contemplation of marriage shall remain in full force after marriage takes place. However, “[a] prenuptial agreement may be voided (1) when obtained through fraud, duress, mistake, or misrepresentation or nondisclosure of material fact, (2) if it was unconscionable when executed, or (3) when the facts and circumstances are so changed since the agreement was executed that its enforcement would be unfair and unreasonable.” Reed, 265 Mich App at 142-143. To determine if a prenuptial agreement is unenforceable because of a change in circumstances, the focus is on whether the changed circumstances were reasonably foreseeable either before or during the signing of the prenuptial agreement. Id. at 144. See also Lentz v Lentz, 271 Mich App 465, 471; 721 NW2d 861 (2006), and Rinvelt, 190 Mich App at 380, holding that an otherwise valid prenuptial agreement could be invalidated on the basis of the nondisclosure of a material fact, or if a change of circumstances since the execution of the agreement make its enforcement unfair and unreasonable.
This issue raises questions of contract interpretation. Defendant asserts that the prenuptial agreement clearly and unambiguously provided for the division of property in the event of divorce, but he fails to address Section 3.1, which states that “the parties specifically agree and state that this Agreement is intended to waive rights upon death and is not made in contemplation of divorce.” The trial court determined, based on this language, that the agreement did not apply to divorce. The trial court did not address the remaining provisions of Section 3, which provide for the division of property in a divorce, notwithstanding the disclaimer in Section 3.1.
A contract must be interpreted according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Holmes v Holmes, 281 Mich App 575, 593; 760 NW2d 300 (2008). A contract is ambiguous if it allows two or more reasonable interpretations, or if the provisions cannot be reconciled with each other. Klapp v United Ins Group Agency, Inc, 468 Mich 459, 467; 663 NW2d 447 (2003); Meagher v Wayne State Univ, 222 Mich App 700, 721-722; 565 NW2d 401 (1997). Under ordinary contract principles if contractual language is clear, construction of the contract is a question of law for the court. Id. If the contract, although inartfully worded or clumsily arranged, fairly admits of but one interpretation, it is not ambiguous. Id. A court may not rewrite clear and unambiguous language under the guise of interpretation. Henderson v State Farm Fire & Cas Co, 460 Mich 348, 354; 596 NW2d 190 (1999). Rather, courts must give “effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a contract and avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the contract surplusage or nugatory.” Klapp, 468 Mich at 463.
Here, the prenuptial agreement is ambiguous. The phrase, “the parties specifically agree and state that this Agreement is intended to waive rights upon death and is not made in contemplation of divorce” does not unambiguously disclaim application of the agreement in the case of divorce. Rather, it could be construed to mean that the contingency of divorce was not the purpose for which the parties entered into the agreement. The inclusion of several provisions for dividing property in the event of divorce militates against the interpretation that the parties intended for the agreement to apply only to dissolution of marriage by death. Assuming, arguendo, that Section 3.1 unambiguously disclaims application of the agreement in the event of divorce, the following sections create an irreconcilable conflict that renders the agreement ambiguous. Klapp, 468 Mich at 467. Disregarding these provisions would violate the principle of giving a contract an interpretation that renders some part of the contract surplusage or nugatory. Id. at 463.
Moreover, Section 3.7 creates multiple options depending upon the enforceability of prenuptial agreements intended to govern property divisions in the event of divorce. This section states as follows:
Whether or not any section of Paragraph 3 of this Pre-Marital Agreement is valid or enforceable, the parties agree that this paragraph is severable from the balance of the Agreement and shall not effect the validity or enforceability of any other provision of this Agreement. This Agreement may be introduced as evidence at the time of any divorce or separation proceedings for the court’s consideration of the parties’ intention at the time of their marriage. [Emphasis added.]
This section both preserves the prenuptial agreement as an agreement in contemplation of death in the event that it is deemed unenforceable in regard to divorce, and preserves the agreement as evidence of the parties’ intent in an action for divorce. Read in conjunction with Section 3.1, the parties assert the following: (1) that the agreement was not made in contemplation of divorce; (2) that the agreement lays out a plan for dividing assets in a divorce; (3) that the plan for dividing assets in a divorce is severable from the contract and would not invalidate the remainder of the contract; and (4) if the plan for dividing assets in a divorce is not enforceable, it can serve as evidence of the parties’ intent. At least two interpretations of this contract are possible: (1) the prenuptial agreement was not intended to govern the division of assets in a divorce; and (2) the prenuptial agreement should govern, or at least guide, the division of assets in a divorce if such provisions are legally enforceable.
Plaintiff argues that the ambiguities of the contract should be construed against defendant as the drafter of the agreement. This is an incorrect statement of the law: the rule of contra proferentem, i.e., that ambiguities are to be construed against the drafter of the contract, should only be applied if all conventional means of contract interpretation, including the consideration of relevant extrinsic evidence, have left the finder of fact unable to determine what the parties intended their contract to mean. Klapp, 468 Mich at 470-471; Smith v Smith, 278 Mich App 198, 200; 748 NW2d 258 (2008).
We remand this case to the trial court to resolve the ambiguity in the prenuptial agreement. On remand, the trial court “must interpret the contract’s terms, in light of the apparent purpose of the contract as a whole, the rules of contract construction, and extrinsic evidence of intent and meaning.” Klapp, 468 Mich at 469. At trial, neither party presented extrinsic evidence regarding the meaning of the prenuptial agreement. The trial court may consider holding an evidentiary hearing on this matter if necessary to construe the prenuptial agreement. On remand, if the trial court determines that the parties intended for the contract to govern division of property in a divorce, it should further consider the meaning of the term “contribution” as used in the prenuptial agreement in reference to assets acquired during the marriage. It may also address plaintiff’s arguments that the prenuptial agreement should be set aside on the basis of changed circumstances.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment as it pertains to the Sawmill Creek property and the Chemical Bank Primevest Account. We remand to the court for further findings and proceedings regarding the following: the decision to award plaintiff alimony in gross in lieu of spousal support; discovery of the P.C. business records; the trial court’s overall division of property and the valuation of certain specific assets; the award of attorney fees to plaintiff; and the interpretation of the prenuptial agreement with respect to divorce. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Posted here by
Terry Bankert
http://attorneybankert.com

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CHERI L. WOODINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v KAMRAN SHOKOOHI, Defendant-Appellee/Cross- Appellant.
Docket No(s) 288923, Published 05/04/2010
Trial Court/lower Court Saginaw County Circuit Court.
Trial Court Judge Robert L. Kaczarek
Lower Court Docket No(s) LC No. 06-060841-DM


[2]
CAP HEADLINES OR (trb)
Terry Bankert
http://attorneybankert.com
MISC
FOOTNOTES
1 Staple v Staple, 241 Mich App 562, 566; 616 NW2d 219 (2000). We note that the holding in Staple is inapplicable because Staple applies “to judgments entered pursuant to the parties’ own negotiated settlement agreements, not to alimony provisions of a judgment entered after an adjudication on the merits.” Id. at 569.